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Abstract The principles of tax smoothing and public debt management with stochas-
tic shocks to future national income are extended for prudence. A prudent government
deliberately underestimates future national income and the tax base, especially if the
variance and persistence of shocks hitting the tax base are large and the tax rate is
high. As a precaution the tax rate is thus set higher and public spending lower to
build precautionary buffers. This leads to gradual reductions in debt and debt service
over time and thus, depending on political preferences, cuts in taxes or increases in
public spending. Prudence offsets the intertemporal spending, tax and debt biases
resulting from common-pool distortions. Appointing a strong finance minister with
as many voting rights as the spending ministers combined ensures that the intratem-
poral common-pool distortions of an excessively large public sector are eliminated.
A strong and prudent minister of finance can thus offset the impatient profligacy of
squabbling spending ministers. However, if voters care about outcomes on election
eve, finance ministers are tempted to build excessive precautionary buffers early on
to dish out tax cuts and boost spending on election eve. Too much prudence may thus
be abused for short-run electoral gains.
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1 Introduction
The reputation of a good minister of finance is based on prudence and caution. A good
minister of finance will be forgiven if unexpected windfall revenues appear, but will
be scorned if the budget turns out year after year worse than expected. Just as the
electorate prefers to appoint an ultraconservative central banker (Rogoff 1985), the
people appreciate a conservative minister of finance. While a central banker should
be curbed to prevent reneging on previous announcements to keep the money supply
in check, a minister of finance is under perennial pressure from spending ministers to
relax budgetary discipline. Intuitively, it thus makes sense to appoint a prudent minis-
ter of finance. This insight inspired the practice in the Netherlands during 1994–2007
of deliberately underestimating future growth in national income by say a quarter
or half percent in order to err on the safe side and not be surprised by unexpected
worsening of the public finances.1 The main objective of this paper is to formalize
this notion of prudent budgetary policy within the context of Barro’s (1979) theory
of tax smoothing and optimal debt management and to provide a political economy
rationale for it. We realize it may have been better to use a more fully specified,
less ad hoc model with proper micro foundations, but we believe the simplicity of
this framework permits a clean analysis of both prudent policy making and of the
game-theoretic interactions between the finance minister and the spending minis-
ters.
The theory of precautionary saving developed for households (e.g., Sibley 1975;
Zeldes 1989; Kimball 1990) can be applied to study the principles of prudent bud-
getary policy and the building of precautionary buffers by governments facing sto-
chastic shocks about future levels of national income and the tax base. Our ap-
proach to deriving precautionary budgetary policy is to introduce prudence or tem-
poral risk aversion into a standard intertemporal welfare loss criterion which trades
off minimizing quadratic tax distortions against minimizing the distance of public
spending from its bliss level and applies earlier work on household saving with
prudence and temporal aversion (van der Ploeg 1993; Bommier and Rochet 2006;
Bommier 2006).2 Prudence implies that the policy maker plays a min-max game
against Nature. The policy maker hedges against undesirable outcomes by postulat-
ing that Nature deliberately chooses shocks to damage the objectives of the policy
maker even though, from a purely statistical point of view, they do not hurt on aver-
age.
A key insight of our paper is that a prudent government deliberately underesti-
mates future forecasts of national income and the tax base. As a precaution the tax
rate is set higher and the level of public spending lower than without prudence and the
government builds precautionary buffers. As a result, even though budgeted tax rates
1The new government of the Netherlands has in 2007 abandoned prudent forecasts of national income
and tax bases. Instead, it claims to be prudent by pursuing a more ambitious target for the final financial
surplus.
2The government thus minimizes an exponential transformation of the quadratic intertemporal welfare
loss function. Given a linear model with additive normally distributed errors, the optimal policy rules are
linear with reaction coefficients that depend on the variances and covariances of the stochastic processes
driving the state variables (Whittle 1990).
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are smoothed over time, expected values of the tax rate gradually fall and/or expected
levels of government spending increase over time as the inevitable windfall revenues
materialize and the level of government debt and thus debt service fall over time. We
show that the extent to which this happens is greater if the degree of prudence of the
government, the variance and persistence of shocks hitting the national income and
the tax base, and the tax rate are relatively high.
Another objective of this paper is to characterize the conditions under which it is
desirable to have a prudent minister of finance within the government. Intuitively, a
prudent minister of finance may be desirable for various reasons. If unexpected falls
in public revenue appear, spending ministers spend lots of time and energy fighting
over which one of them has to implement the spending cuts to balance the budget and
the minister of finance is under great pressure to relax the budgetary rules. This is not
conducive to good government. Too much time and energy is wasted on squabbling
rather than on necessary reforms and cracking necessary tough political decisions. It
is thus desirable to have a prudent budgetary policy, so that on average unexpected
windfall revenues are more likely than shortfalls in expected revenues. Another justi-
fication of why it is desirable to have a minister of finance who is more prudent than
the average voter is that ex ante the minister of finance realizes that ex post it will be
hard to discipline the spending ministers in his cabinet. Profligate spending ministers
and a weak minister of finance give rise to a common-pool problem. This results in
an upward bias in public spending claims, a tilt of the government spending profile
from the future towards the present and of the tax profile from the present to the
future, and thus excessive accumulation of government debt (Persson and Tabellini
2000, Chap. 13; Velasco 2000). We formalize these insights by explicitly analyzing
the strategic interaction between the minister of finance and the spending ministers
in the cabinet.
We show that it is in the interest of society to appoint a relatively prudent minister
of finance, which can offset the intertemporal spending, tax and debt biases result-
ing from the common-pool problem. If in addition the minister of finance has the
unequivocal backing of the prime minister and has at least as many votes in the cab-
inet as the spending ministers combined, he also has sufficient power to overcome
intratemporal biases resulting in an excessively large public sector. The prospect of
being removed from office by a political rival who prefers different public goods
(Alesina and Tabellini 1990) or a different size of the public sector (Persson and
Svensson 1989) also gives the incumbent an incentive to spend more on its (pet)
project and to run up a debt in order to tie the hands of its potential successor. Al-
though we focus on conflict in the council of ministers and abstract from partisan
preferences, such political distortions may strengthen the case for appointing a pru-
dent minister of finance.
Section 2 extends the traditional theory of tax smoothing and determination of
public debt to allow for endogenous public spending and for prudence, and derives
our key insight about underestimating the tax base and building precautionary buffers.
As a precaution, the tax rate is thus set higher while public spending is set lower. Gov-
ernment borrowing is still warranted for temporary government spending and to cover
temporary losses of revenues in a recession. Section 3 demonstrates that with a frag-
mented government, ministers spend too much and too soon and postpone taxation.
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As a result of this dynamic common-pool problem, there is excessive accumulation
of government debt. Section 4 shows that it is desirable in this context to appoint a
strong and prudent minister of finance. Section 5 shows that too much prudence can
be abused for short-term electoral gains. Section 6 concludes.
2 Precautionary taxation and debt management with uncertainty about future
income
To keep matters simple, we assume only two time periods. If there is no inherited
debt and the growth-corrected rate of interest and the discount rate are zero, we can
write the present-value government budget constraint as





where gt denotes the share of public spending in GDP at time t, τt the tax rate at time
t, d the debt-GDP ratio (or the deficit) at the end of the first period, τ¯ the tax rate
around which the government budget constraint is linearized, and ε the stochastic
shock to GDP and the tax base in period 2. The stochastic shocks to income and the
tax base are normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ 2. Any government
debt incurred by the excess of spending over taxes in the first period must thus be
paid off in the second period by an excess of taxes over spending. Henceforth, we
follow Barro (1979) and assume that the government has a welfare loss function Γ in
terms of the squared tax rate to capture tax collection costs (or tax distortions). Since
we are interested in the trade-off between tax cuts and public spending increases, we
also include squared deviations of public spending from its bliss value in the welfare
loss function (see Appendix for a rudimentary micro foundation). The government














τ 2t + χ(gˆ − gt )2
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, (2)
where χ > 0 denotes the priority attached to higher public spending and the bliss
values of the tax rate and public spending are zero and gˆ > 0, respectively. To
allow for prudence, the government maximizes Φ(θ) subject to the government
budget constraint (1), where θ > 0 denotes the degree of prudence or caution of
the government. The risk-neutral case corresponds to Φ(θ) → −E[Γ/d0, y0] as
θ → 0. If θ var(Γ ) is small, Φ(θ) ∼= −E(Γ ) + θ2 var(Γ ), which in a local kind
of way illustrates that θ also captures the degree of risk aversion. Two govern-
ments may share the same welfare criterion under certainty, but their aversion to
risk may differ. The government maximizes (2) or equivalently the expected value of
U(Γ ∗) ≡ − exp(−θΓ ∗) where Γ ∗ ≡ −Γ . The coefficient of absolute risk aversion,
θ ≡ −U ′′/U ′ > 0, also captures prudence, since U ′′′ = θ3 exp(−θΓ ∗) > 0 (Kimball
1990). Prudence implies the willingness to avoid shocks with adverse consequences.
In the optimal outcome government plays a game against Nature (Whittle 1990;
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subject to (1). (3)
The government thus chooses the tax rate and public spending to minimize this min-
max criterion and assumes the worst by postulating that the national income distur-
bance is drawn in a way that maximizes this criterion. This leads to the following
expressions for the optimal first-period tax rate and public spending, the budgeted
underestimation of national income (εB) and public debt:
g1 =
[
2χ − θσ 2τ¯ 2χ
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If the government is risk-neutral (θ = 0), certainty equivalence holds and optimal
first-period policies follow from setting εB = 0. In that case, it is optimal to smooth
the tax rates and the levels of public spending (i.e., g1 = E[g2] = τ1 = E[τ2] =
χgˆ/(1 + χ)) and to run a balanced budget (d = 0). If the national income turns out
better than expected (ε > 0), there is room to lower the tax rate and increase public
spending in the second period. With prudent policy making (θ > 0), the government
underestimates future income and tax base to be on the safe side (εB < 0). As a
consequence, the first-period tax rate is set higher, first-period public spending is set
lower and precautionary buffers are accumulated (d < 0). During the second period,
the tax rate is lowered and public spending increased even without positive shocks
to national income. Hence, precautionary buffers induce a downward tilt of tax rates
and upward tilt of public spending. Governments who care more about tax distor-
tions than spending targets (lower χ) have lower tax rates and thus their correction
for prudence is smaller also.
Proposition 1 It is prudent to have precautionary taxation and under-spending and
build assets to safeguard against future adverse shocks to the tax base. The precau-
tionary buffers and the windfall revenues allow taxes to fall and public spending to
rise over time.
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These results can be extended to allow for infinite horizons, non-zero growth-
corrected real interest rates and discount rates, non-zero inherited debt, and AR(1)
processes for deviations of national income from trend (van der Ploeg 2007).3 The
government then underestimates shocks to the tax base more strongly if prudence is
substantial, variances and persistence of shocks are large, and the tax rate is high.
The expected deficit is less than warranted by projected hikes in public spending or
temporary recessions, especially if the degree of prudence, the variance of shocks to
the tax base and the tax rate are relatively large. A temporary recession and fall in
the tax base or a temporary increase in desired public spending (e.g., due to a war)
are accommodated by a higher deficit, not by a higher tax rate. Permanent shocks
to national income and the tax base or to the target level of public spending are ac-
commodated by the tax rate, not by the deficit. The correction for prudence is much
greater for permanent than temporary shocks, so the precautionary level of taxation
is much higher. More persistent stochastic shocks to national income imply that it
is prudent to have a larger budgeted underestimation of the tax base, which leads to
more precautionary taxation, lower levels of public spending and bigger precaution-
ary buffers (or reductions in public debt).
With a permanent fall in national income, say, the tax rate is higher and public
spending is lower on impact than without prudence. On top of the interest on precau-
tionary buffers, the government can on average expect windfall revenues that enable
debt to be paid off. The resulting financial leeway permits a gradual rise in the level
of public spending and fall in the tax rate. In the long run the government builds up
sufficient interest-bearing assets to generate the interest revenue necessary to pay for
the long-run increase in public spending and compensate for the fall in the tax base.
The tax rate converges asymptotically to zero. In addition, public spending slowly
climbs to its bliss value.
Although we have not specified micro foundations, our results will go through
under some special assumptions.4 The micro-founded literature also finds that gov-
ernments should accumulate claims on the private sector and use the interest revenue
to get rid of labor market distortions. In representative-agent models with government
commitment, this holds irrespective of whether there is capital accumulation or not
and whether asset markets are complete (Chari et al. 1994) or incomplete (Aiyagari et
3One can also allow for unemployment benefits and public sector investment. The underestimation of the
tax base is then larger if the unemployment benefit is higher. The higher the tax rate and the unemployment
benefit, the more sensitive tax revenues and the benefit bill are to business cycle variations, the bigger the
underestimation of the tax base. Prudence now also leads to under-spending on public investment projects.
As a result, net worth of the public sector increases over time and the government can be expected to
gradually lower the tax burden and gradually increase spending on consumption goods and capital.
4Our framework can be given micro foundations if utility is quasi-linear and utility of money is constant,
labor supply and output are exogenous, disutility of work is quadratic in labor supply, production losses
resulting from tax collection are proportional to the square of the tax rate, and households cannot accu-
mulate assets. If also the government can borrow on the world markets against a given interest rate r , and
the wage follows from the factor price frontier, expression (2) for social welfare corresponds to aggregate
utility of households and the present-value budget constraint (1) is justified. It is more satisfying to recast
Barro’s model in a general equilibrium framework with incomplete markets and utility quasi-linear in con-
sumption, so the government has no access to state-contingent debt and cannot manipulate intertemporal
prices (e.g., Aiyagari et al. 2002).
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al. 2002). But with complete markets the planner must set an initial tax on debt to ob-
tain an instantaneous and non-distortionary wealth transfer. With incomplete markets
the same can be obtained in the long run by precautionary saving of the government.5
3 Squabbling spending ministers
Section 4 demonstrates that a case can be made for appointing a prudent finance min-
ister, since such a finance minister is better able to fend off the unfettered claims of the
spending ministers. Before this is done, we discuss the dynamic common-pool prob-
lem for budgetary policies with a fragmented government without prudence. Each
spending minister wants a large share of revenues and is not particularly interested in
balancing the budget. Ex ante the minister of finance realizes that ex post it is tougher
to discipline the spending ministers in his cabinet. If the minister of finance is not in
firm control, the unfettered claims of the spending ministers give rise to a common-
pool problem. This implies an upward bias in public spending and excessive accumu-
lation of government debt as discussed in Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chaps. 13.1
and 13.2).6 It also induces a departure from tax smoothing, since spending ministers
try to defer taxation and spending cuts. Such biases occur as each spending minister
tries to get its hands on scarce public revenue before the other spending ministers
get a chance to do so. To make the point, we allow for N spending ministers. The




g1i − τ1 = τ2 + τ¯ ε −
N∑
i=1





where gti indicates spending by minister i at time t . We focus on symmetric outcomes
and thus set the same priorities and bliss values for all public spending categories.












5With heterogeneous agents households accumulate public debt as buffer against individual idiosyncratic
shocks while the planner prefers to accumulate private debt as buffer against aggregate risk (Aiyagari 1995;
Aiyagari and McGrattan 1998). Long-run government debt will then occur only if idiosyncratic risk is more
important than aggregate risk and there are no other assets that allow self-insurance (Shin 2006).
6The spending bias resulting from fiscal illusion (i.e., the overestimation of the benefit of a particular
activity) may be contained by appropriate budgetary processes, which depend on what kind of uncertainty
dominates the budget process (Von Hagen and Harden 1995). Another way to constrain profligate spending
ministers is to delegate authority to monitor and punish to the minister of finance. This may work better
in countries with non-proportional representation and one-party states (Hallerberg and von Hagen 1997).
Appointment of a spending-averse minister of finance is better than binding budget targets imposed by the
prime minister, because it induces spending ministers to propose less ambitious budgets and appoint less
spending-prone bureaucrats (Swank 2002).
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The minister of finance minimizes the expected value of the sum of the welfare loss
functions of each of the spending ministers and also postulates that future distur-
bances are drawn to hurt social welfare. We first consider the cooperative outcome,
where the minister of finance and the spending ministers jointly minimize the ex-
pected value of the social welfare loss L1 + · · · + LN subject to (1′) in the absence
of prudence. We then contrast this with the non-cooperative outcome in the absence
of prudence where spending ministers lead in their spending claims and the minister
of finance follows in setting the tax rate and public debt. We show that the non-
cooperative outcome leads to the following distortions: a tilt towards future rather
than present taxation, a tilt towards present rather than future public consumption, ex-
cessive accumulation of government debt, and an upward bias in total public spending
and the average tax rate.
3.1 Cooperative outcome















τ¯ ε2, i = 1, . . . ,N,















where superscript C indicates the cooperative outcome. It is optimal ex ante for the
social planner to smooth the levels of public spending and the tax rate over time.
Since there are no changes in the targets for government spending or the tax base
over time, there is no need for government debt. A bigger priority to public goods χ
leads to higher spending and tax rates.
3.2 Nash outcome with pre-commitment
One way to calculate the non-cooperative outcome is to assume pre-commitment





























where the superscript O indicates the open-loop Nash outcome. In the non-
cooperative outcome with pre-commitment, we see that spending and tax rates are
higher than in the cooperative outcome. Since spending ministers are only concerned
with their own budget, they do not take full account of the tax distortions caused
by the total budget. Tax rates and public spending levels are smoothed, so there is
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no need for government debt. Hence, there are no intertemporal distortions, only in-
tratemporal distortions in the Nash outcome with pre-commitment. If the minister
of finance and the prime minister together get just as many votes as the spending
ministers combined, the Nash outcome with pre-commitment becomes the coopera-
tive outcome and the intratemporal distortions leading to an excessively large public
sector are eliminated.
3.3 Subgame-perfect Nash outcome
It is more realistic to assume that there is no pre-commitment in which case the
subgame-perfect Nash outcome is appropriate. Working backwards each spending
minister takes past government debt and spending plans of his colleagues as given.
















+ χ(gˆ − g2i )2
]
, i = 1, . . . ,N, (9)
where we have substituted the second-period budget constraint from (1′). The optimal
reaction function for minister i is thus given by
g2i =
χgˆ − d1 + τ¯ ε2 − ∑j =i g2j
1 + χ , i = 1, . . . ,N, (10)
so that he spends more if there is a small outstanding debt and a positive income
shocks. If his colleagues spend more, the cost of funds goes up and he spends less.
The resulting symmetric Nash equilibrium for the second-period level of spending
and the tax rate is given by
gN2i =
χgˆ − d1 + τ¯ ε2







(Ngˆ + d1 − τ¯ ε2),
(11)
where the superscript N indicates the subgame-perfect Nash outcome. Turning to the
first period and substituting the first part of (1′) and (11) into (6), we see that minister
i chooses first-period spending to minimize its welfare loss:




















− τ1 − τ¯ ε2
]2)
, (12)
and the finance minister chooses the tax rate τ1 to minimize L1 + · · · + LN . The
resulting first-order conditions are
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(Ngˆ + Ng1i − τ1), (13)
which states that the marginal cost of taxation must equal the marginal benefit of
public goods in the first period and also equal the marginal cost of public debt (i.e.,
the marginal cost of lower spending and higher taxes in the future). The resulting
symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes for the first period are
gN1i =
[
(N + χ)2 + (χ − N)(1 + χ)
(N + χ)(N + 2χ + 1)
]









(N + χ)2 − (χ + N)(1 + χ)
(N + χ)(N + 2χ + 1)
]
Ngˆ > 0.
Due to the linear-quadratic-Gaussian nature of the optimization problem and the ab-
sence of prudence, certainty equivalence applies, so optimal first-period spending and
debt can be obtained by setting the future income shock to its expected value of zero.
Upon substitution of (14) into (11), we obtain the subgame-perfect Nash outcomes
for the second period:
gN2i =
[
χ(N + 2χ + 1) − N(N − 1)






































































and dN1 > 0.
(16)
From (15) and (16) we see that the subgame-perfect Nash outcome suffers from two
types of distortions. First, the sum of spending levels and of the tax rate over the two
periods is the same as in the Nash equilibrium with pre-commitment and thus higher
than in the cooperative outcome. This is the familiar intratemporal distortion towards
an excessive public sector. Second, government consumption is tilted towards the first
period, taxation is tilted towards the second period, and, as a consequence, there is
excessive government debt. These are the intertemporal distortions. In fact, spending
in the first period is greater in the subgame-perfect Nash than in the cooperative
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outcome.7 Since each spending minister (or group of a coalition) decides part of
the budget and nobody controls the aggregate budgetary outcome, ministers spend
too much and too soon and postpone taxation so that borrowing is too high. These
two types of common-pool distortions arise from the lack of a proper definition of
property rights to tax revenues.
The common-pool distortions worsen when the number of spending ministers in-
creases. More claims on the common budget worsen the biases to spend too much
and too soon and postpone taxation. Also, comparing (15) with (7), a positive shock
to national income induces a smaller increase in public spending and the tax rate in
the non-cooperative outcome. Finally, the expected welfare loss is obviously greater
in the subgame-perfect Nash than in the Nash outcome with pre-commitment and a
fortiori so than in the cooperative outcome.
Proposition 2 A fragmented government leads to a dynamic common-pool problem.
The government spends too much and too soon while it postpones taxation. Conse-
quently, there is too much government debt. Since eventually debt has to be paid off,
the tax rate rises and the spending level falls over time. These intertemporal and in-
tratemporal distortions become more severe when there are many spending ministers.
4 Case for a strong and prudent minister of finance
A key question is how the common-political distortions arising from fragmented de-
cision making can be offset. We conjecture that this can be done if the minister of
finance is strong and prudent enough. A strong minister of finance may help to over-
come the intratemporal distortions of spending and taxing too much. A prudent min-
ister of finance deliberately underestimates the tax base and thus ensures that govern-
ment spending occurs later than sooner while taxation occurs earlier rather than later.
As a result, a prudent finance minister can offset the debt bias and the intertemporal
distortions of the common-pool problem. We are thus searching for a relatively strong
priority of avoiding tax distortions, i.e., a weight χ∗ lower than the weight χ given
by the spending ministers to reaching the spending target, and a level of prudence θ∗
that will offset the intertemporal biases of fragmented policy making.
Of course, if the electorate itself is prudent, it makes sense for a benevolent gov-
ernment to be prudent as well. However, even if the electorate and the spending min-
isters are not prudent, it may be attractive to appoint a minister of finance with more
prudent preferences than the electorate and his spending colleagues. More precisely,
a minister of finance can strengthen his position in the cabinet by implementing a
prudent budgetary policy to offset the biases resulting from the common-pool prob-
lem. It is thus in the interest of society to appoint a prudent minister of finance who
deliberately underestimates the future tax base and enforces precautionary taxation
and under-spending. In as far as a strong and prudent minister of finance is able to off-
set the distortions of the dynamic common-pool problem and control the squabbling
spending ministers, social welfare will be increased to its socially optimal level.
7Also, if χ(2χ + N) > N2, we establish that E(gN2i ) > gC1i = gC2i .
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Consider therefore a strong and prudent finance minister with χ∗ < χ and θ > 0
and examine how this affects the subgame-perfect Nash outcome of Sect. 3 and see
whether this can improve social welfare. The cabinet will then deliberately depress
forecasts of future national income and the tax base. The finance minister is prudent











































Ngˆ+Ng1i −τ1 − τ¯ εB2
)
. (13′)
Using (13′) and (15) to substitute expressions for all variables in terms of τ1 into
the present-value budget constraint (1′) yields the following expressions for the first-




2θσ 2τNχ∗(1 + χ∗)
(N + χ∗)(N + 2χ∗ + 1) − θσ 2τ¯ 2Nχ∗(1 + χ∗)
)
Ngˆ < E(ε2) = 0, (17)
gF1i =
[
(N + χ∗)2 + (χ∗ − N)(1 + χ∗) − θσ 2τ¯ 2Nχ∗(1 + χ∗)
(N + χ∗)(N + 2χ∗ + 1) − θσ 2τ¯ 2Nχ∗(1 + χ∗)
]




(N + χ∗)(N + 2χ∗ + 1) − θσ 2τ¯ 2Nχ∗(1 + χ∗)
]
Ngˆ > 0 (14′)
and dF1 =
[
(N + χ∗)2 − (χ∗ + N)(1 + χ∗) − θσ 2τ¯ 2Nχ∗(1 + χ∗)
(N + χ∗)(N + 2χ∗ + 1) − θσ 2τ¯ 2Nχ∗(1 + χ∗)
]
Ngˆ > 0.
Here superscript F indicates the outcome with a prudent minister of finance. Ex-
pression (17) indicates that the minister of finance deliberately underestimates future
income to be on the safe side. Second-period public spending and the tax rate follow
readily from the second-period government budget constraint:
gF2i =
(
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Proposition 3 If the minister of finance has as much power as all the spending min-
isters combined and has enough, but not too much prudence,
χ∗ = χ/N < χ and θ = (N + χ
∗)(N − 1)
Nχ∗(1 + χ∗)τ¯ 2σ 2 =
(N2 + χ)(N − 1)
χ(N + χ)τ¯ 2σ 2 ≡ θ
∗ > 0
if N > 1, (18)
the intratemporal and intertemporal distortions of the common-pool problem are ex-
actly offset and the cooperative outcome is attained. If the degree of prudence is less
than this critical value (θ < θ∗), the common-pool distortions dominate the effects
of prudence. Hence, government debt will be positive and spending will be too soon
and taxation too late. If the degree of prudence is bigger (θ > θ∗), the government
builds up assets and thus spending is too late and taxation too soon. If the minister
of finance is less strong (χ∗ < χ/N), the public sector will be too big.
Proof Equation (18) implies from (14′) that dF1 = 0 and thus that τF1 = τC1 and gF1i =
gC1i . The results for when θ is less or greater than θ
∗ follow immediately. 
The biases of spending too much and too soon and delaying taxation are thus offset
by a sufficiently strong and prudent minister of finance. If the minister of finance is
not strong enough, he cannot control its profligate and impatient spending colleagues.
If the minister of finance effectively has as much power as all his spending colleagues
together, it eliminates the intratemporal distortions. Precautionary taxation and under-
spending allow for a gradual reduction in government debt. They also lead on average
to expected windfall revenues, so that over time the level of public spending can rise
and the tax rate can fall. Prudence is thus able to offset the intertemporal distortions
arising from the dynamic common-pool problem.
The calculations in Table 1 illustrate these two ways of correcting the biases. The
Nash equilibrium with pre-commitment only suffers from intratemporal distortions:
Table 1 Strong and prudent finance minister mitigates common-pool problem
Ng1i Ng2i d1 τ1 τ2 ε
B
2 Li
Cooperative 0.3333 0.3333 0 0.3333 0.3333 0 0.2
Nash: commitment 0.4286 0.4286 0 0.4286 0.4286 0 0.2204
Nash: perfect 0.4418 0.4154 0.0462 0.3956 0.4615 0 0.2217
Prudent θσ 2τ¯ = 0.1 0.4386 0.4186 0.0350 0.4036 0.4536 −0.0807 0.2212
Prudent θσ 2τ¯ = 0.2 0.4352 0.4219 0.0233 0.4119 0.4452 −0.1648 0.2207
Prudent θσ 2τ¯ = 0.35 0.4300 0.4272 0.0050 0.4250 0.4321 −0.2975 0.2204
Prudent θσ 2τ¯ = 0.4 0.4282 0.4290 −0.0014 0.4296 0.4275 −0.3437 0.2204
Strong and prudent
χ∗ = 2.5, θσ 2τ¯ = 0.4 0.3522 0.3145 0.0425 0.3097 0.3569 −0.2478 0.2010
χ∗ = 2.5, θσ 2τ¯ = 0.8 0.3358 0.3308 0.0057 0.3302 0.3365 −0.5283 0.2000
Parameters: τ¯ = gˆ = 0.3, χ = 5 and N = 2
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government spending levels and tax rates are higher than in the cooperative outcome
(0.4286 > 0.3333), but there is no excessive debt accumulation (d1 = 0). To get rid
of this bias, it suffices to give the minister of finance at least as many votes in the cab-
inet as the spending ministers combined (i.e., reduce χ = 5 to χ∗ = χ/N = 2.5). The
subgame-perfect Nash outcome gives rise to the intertemporal distortions of spending
too soon, taxing too late and excessive debt accumulation, but average spending levels
and tax rates correspond exactly to the ones in the equilibrium with pre-commitment
(i.e., 12 (0.4418 + 0.4154) = 12 (0.3956 + 0.4615 = 0.4286). Prudent budgetary pol-
icy offsets the bias of spending too much and too soon and the resulting debt bias.
By deliberately budgeting the future national income and tax revenues too low, the
minister of finance forces his spending colleagues to spend later, to not postpone tax-
ation and to accumulate less debt. As the degree of prudence θσ 2τ increases towards
0.8571 as predicted by (18), it is optimal to spend less today and more tomorrow,
to borrow less and bring forward taxation. If θσ 2τ approaches 0.3889 (i.e., the ex-
pression for θ in (18) evaluated at χ∗ = χ = 5), the debt bias completely disappears
and the subgame-perfect Nash outcome with prudence has become the Nash outcome
with pre-commitment. The final rows show that with a strong and even more prudent
minister of finance (i.e., with χ∗ = 2.5 and θσ 2τ¯ = 0.8571), all intratemporal and
intertemporal welfare losses arising from the common-pool problem are mitigated.
The case for a strong and prudent minister of finance is strengthened by the fol-
lowing qualitative argument. Governments need to spend as much of their time and
energy as possible on important and necessary economic and political reforms and
cannot afford to waste political momentum on squabbling. However, whenever there
are unexpected falls in public revenues, ministers taking care of the spending depart-
ments fight over who must implement the spending cuts to balance the budget and
the minister of finance is pressurized to relax the budgetary rules. In contrast, if there
are windfall revenues, the cabinet members find it easier to agree on what to do with
them. The government may thus find it attractive to have a prudent budgetary policy,
so that on average unexpected windfall revenues occur more frequently than shortfalls
in expected revenues and more time and energy is left for important political matters.
Our normative results and especially the highlighted intra-governmental benefits
of appointing a prudent finance minister hinge on the particular specification of the
welfare function we have adopted. In particular, the potential benefits of a prudent
finance minister depend on the squared terms for the tax rates and public spending in
our ad hoc welfare criterion capturing true welfare and offering reliable insights.
5 Warning: prudence may solicit electoral budget cycles
Many governments adopt a ‘first-sour-then-sweet’ policy whereby unpopular policies
such as raising tax rates and trimming public spending are implemented immedi-
ately upon election into office while popular policies of cutting tax rates and boosting
public spending occur just before the next election. There may be short-run politi-
cal benefits from loosening budgetary discipline just before an election, but only if
citizens are myopic.8 Such opportunistic political manipulation is made possible by
8The pioneering work of Nordhaus (1975) on the political business cycle is based on myopic citizens.
Opportunistic, pre-election manipulation of the expectations-augmented Phillips curve creates jobs on
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the assets accumulated from precautionary taxation and under-spending. By reducing
government debt and accumulating assets, the minister of finance builds up a buffer
that can be used to cut taxes and boost public spending towards election eve. As long
as this is not overdone, electoral cycle motivations may help to offset the intertem-
poral common-pool distortions of spending too soon and taxing too late. However,
there is the danger that excessively large buffers are accumulated by the minister of
finance in order to dish out excessively big tax cuts and spending hikes on election
eve for short-run political gains.9 Short-run political manipulation of election results
may thus lead to an excessively prudent budgetary policy. To see this, we change
the weight on second-period welfare losses in (6) from 1 to 1 + π with π > 0 and







= χ∗(gˆ − g1i ) = τ1





× (Ngˆ + Ng1i − τ1 − τ¯ εB2
)
. (13′′)
Hence, following the same procedure as before, we find
τE1 =
[
2(1 + π)χ∗(1 + χ∗)
(N + χ∗)2 + (1 + π)[(N + χ∗)(1 + χ∗) − θσ 2τ¯ 2Nχ∗(1 + χ∗)]
]
× Ngˆ > 0,
whence NgE1i = Ngˆ − τF1 , i = 1, . . . ,N,


















election eve while the inflationary effects appear after the election. Apart from not fitting the empirical
facts very well (Drazen 2000), it is unlikely that people are foolish and irrational enough to be manipulated
in such a way. Also, electoral cycles seem to be driven more by fiscal policy than monetary policy. Such
opportunistic, pre-electoral manipulation can be rationalized when there is imperfect information about an
incumbent’s competence (Rogoff 1990). In such a context expansionary policy before an election indicates
high competence. Partisan differences about the size of the public sector or the nature of public goods can
also induce a pre-election debt bias (e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2000, Chap. 13.3).
9Indeed, the ‘prudent’ finance minister Gerrit Zalm has been accused of being tough in post-election years
but exuberant and irresponsible in each pre-election year. Critics argue that under his reign the structural
deficit and volatility of output and consumption have increased, but that he was ‘saved’ by the extra gas
revenues resulting from temporary high oil prices (Jacobs 2007; Beetsma and van Wijnbergen 2007).
Minister Zalm may thus have abused his ‘prudent’ budgetary policy for short-run electoral gains. The
same critics complain that minister Zalm has in election years immediately converted temporary windfall
revenues into permanent tax cuts (1998, 2005) or public spending hikes (2001).
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Table 2 Opportunistic manipulation of election outcomes
Ng1i Ng2i d1 τ1 τ2 Li
π = 0.15, θσ 2 τ¯ = 0 0.3482 0.3185 0.0334 0.3148 0.3519 0.2006
π = 0.29, θσ 2 τ¯ = 0 0.3333 0.3333 0 0.3333 0.3333 0.2
π = 0.45, θσ 2 τ¯ = 0 0.3173 0.3493 −0.0360 0.3534 0.3133 0.2007
π = 0.15, θσ 2 τ¯ = 0.4 0.3313 0.3354 −0.0046 0.3359 0.3308 0.2133
π = 0.15, θσ 2 τ¯ = 0.857 0.3089 0.3577 −0.0549 0.3638 0.3028 0.2151
π = 0, θσ 2 τ¯ = 0.503 0.3482 0.3185 0.0034 0.3148 0.3519 0.2006
Parameters: τ¯ = gˆ = 0.3, χ∗ = 2.5 and N = 2
where the superscript E denotes this electoral outcome. It is easy to show that (19)
implies an electoral business cycle with higher taxes and lower spending upon moving
into office and lower taxes and higher spending just before the next election. The
government thus has an incentive to build up assets towards election eve in order to
dish out favors to the voters.
The first three rows of Table 2 show what happens in the presence of a strong and
opportunistic (but not a prudent) minister of finance. For small values of π it is possi-
ble to have a welfare improvement vis-à-vis the subgame-perfect Nash outcome with
χ∗ = 2.5, but for large values of π opportunistic political manipulation is excessive
and leads to a deterioration of welfare. In other words, if the electorate ‘forgets’ past
outcomes quickly, electoral budget cycles are more likely to reduce welfare. Modest
short-run manipulation of election outcomes ensures, like prudence, more effective
political decision making and makes it possible to control squabbling spending min-
isters, but not if public debt or assets induce excessive electoral budget cycles to
the detriment of social welfare. If the electorate’s effective discount rate of the past
equals 1/1.2857 = 0.7777 (or π = 0.2857), the opportunistic electoral outcome ex-
actly reproduces the first-best cooperative outcome. In that case, the intertemporal
common-pool distortions are exactly offset by just the right amount of opportunistic
manipulation of election results. In general, this happens if public debt is zero and
the rate of memory loss of the electorate equals
1 + π = (N + χ
∗)2
[N + χ∗(1 + θσ 2τ¯ 2N)](1 + χ∗) >
N + χ∗
1 + χ∗ if θσ
2τ¯ > 0. (20)
Expression (20) indicates that a strong and prudent minister of finance needs to be
less opportunistic to ensure that the first-best outcome is attained. The fourth and
fifth rows of Table 2 illustrate this for a rate of memory loss π = 0.15. Note that
introducing prudence even a little to below a level that was necessary to generate the
first-best outcome in the absence of memory loss, i.e., θσ 2τ¯ < 0.857 (see Table 1),
there is already accumulation of public assets. Less prudence is thus needed to ensure
the first-best outcome if the electorate has memory loss. Clearly, an opportunistic
minister of finance builds up assets to present nice results on election eve. A minister
of finance may not want to be seen to be involved in opportunistic manipulation of
election results even though the electorate has memory loss of π = 0.15. The minister
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of finance can then obtain a similar flattering election outcome by adopting a prudent
budgetary policy. The final row of Table 2 illustrates that the minister of finance can
then approach opportunistic outcome of the first row by setting the level of prudence
equal to 0.503.
Proposition 4 If the electorate weighs outcomes on election eve more heavily than
those in the early part of the incumbency, politicians are encouraged to cut taxes and
raise spending financed by running up government debt just before an election. As
a result, a less prudent budgetary policy is required to offset the intertemporal dis-
tortions arising from squabbling spending ministers and attain the first-best outcome.
The danger is that too much prudence is abused by opportunistic ministers of finance.
6 Concluding remarks
Principles of sound prudent budgetary policy require that the minister of finance de-
liberately underestimate the future level of the national income and the tax base, es-
pecially if the variance and persistence of shocks hitting national income and the tax
base are large, and the level of the tax rate (and the unemployment benefit) is large.
The principle of precautionary taxation thus requires that the tax rate be set higher
than it would have been done otherwise. As precaution, the level of public spending
is also set lower. Due to build-up of precautionary buffers and also the likely realiza-
tion of windfall revenues, government debt falls over time. The associated reduction
in debt service permits, depending on political preferences, either a gradual reduction
in the tax rate, an increase in the public spending or a combination of both.
An important advantage of prudent budgetary policy is that it generates peace and
quiet in the council of ministers. Without prudent forecasts of national income and the
tax base, the likelihood of unexpected falls in tax receipts and consequent budgetary
fights is much bigger. The ministers then waste a lot of time and energy on squabbling
to try to offload the costs of further cuts on their colleagues. That time and energy
would have been much better spent on important policy issues and reforms. With
spending ministers squabbling over a common pool of public revenues, it is attractive
to give the minister of finance at least as many voting rights in the cabinet as all
the spending ministers combined. This eliminates the intratemporal common-pool
distortions of an excessively large public sector. The minister of finance should also
adopt a prudent budgetary policy to avoid spending too soon and taxing too late. This
gets rid of the intertemporal common-pool distortions. A strong and prudent minister
of finance can thus control the claims of his spending colleagues and avoid excessive
debt accumulation.
It is straightforward to extend the present framework to allow for uncertainty about
future projections in the actual or desired levels of public spending, the future returns
on public sector capital or the future interest on public debt and to allow for more
general data generating processes for national income and the tax base. It is then pru-
dent to budget for slightly higher levels of future government spending and the market
rate of interest and for slightly lower levels of future financial returns on public sector
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capital than the mathematically expected levels.10 Again, the minister of finance on
average enjoys less ambitious spending desires and higher returns on public sector
assets than budgeted as well as windfall revenues as time proceeds and is thus able
to gradually cut debt service and the tax rate and increase the level of public con-
sumption and public investment. Another extension is to introduce quadratic costs of
adjustment for the stock of public sector capital or the level of government spending.
One can also allow for adverse effects of the tax rate on the tax base. The marginal
cost of taxation is then likely to increase in recessions and fall during booms. This
strengthens the case for a prudent counter-cyclical policy. Also, the structural un-
employment rate may be positively affected by taxation. This also strengthens the
case for such a prudent policy, because one does not want to increase tax rates in a
recession as this would increase unemployment even further.
Prudence favors accumulation of assets to cope with future risk, but then it is op-
timal to spend less on actions to prevent risk with adverse consequences (e.g., Eeck-
houdt and Gollier 2005). Similarly, a prudent minister of finance who has accumu-
lated a big buffer is less likely to take actions to prevent the tax base from shrinking
and is more likely to dish out favors towards election eve. It is therefore interesting
to further develop the rationale for a strong and prudent minister of finance within
the context of a political business cycle framework with finite election horizons. In
practice, newly elected governments adopt a finite horizon, typically the period to the
next election, and set themselves a target for the final financial deficit or surplus.11
The key question is how prudent and strong a finance minister should be to find an
optimal trade-off between the common-pool distortions in fragmented governments
and short-run election motives. If the electorate ‘forgets’ quickly, the adverse welfare
effects of short-run political manipulation dominate the beneficial welfare effects of
offsetting the intertemporal biases of the common-pool problem. Hence, if the elec-
torate can be wooed by results on election eve, a less prudent policy is needed to
offset the intertemporal distortions of squabbling spending ministers.
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10In general equilibrium models with incomplete markets, the government also builds a war chest of assets
as a precaution against the unpredictable necessities of war (Aiyagari et al. 2002).
11A lax final target combined with prudent budgeting may then even be less cautious than an ambitious
final target combined with realistic budgeting.
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Appendix
With some rudimentary micro foundations, one can justify this welfare criterion.
With output in the first period being set to 1 and in the second period to 1 + ε, the
goods market equilibrium conditions in the two periods are c1 + g1 = 1 − φτ 21 and
c2 + g2 = 1 + ε − φτ 22 , where ct denotes private consumption in period t and the pa-
rameter φ defines the magnitude of the tax collection costs. If felicity in each period
is given by [ct − 12χφ(gˆ∗ − g2t )]/φ, we obtain (2) with gˆ = gˆ∗ + (φχ)−1. Hence, the
bliss level of public spending is adjusted upwards somewhat. The household budget
constraints c1 = 1 − τ1 − d − 12φτ 21 and c2 = 1 − τ2(1 + ε) + d − 12φτ 22 are auto-
matically satisfied due to Walras’s law, so that d also indicates private saving. The
household and government budget constraints use the first-order Taylor series ap-
proximation τ2(1 + ε) ∼= τ2 + τ¯ ε, where τ¯ > 0 is the value of the second-period tax
rate around which the budget constraints are linearized.
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